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Abstract
This paper investigates the degree of competition in the WAEMU financial indus-
try over the period 2002-2007 using firm-level data (591 year-firm observations).
Market structure analysis, the Panzar-Rosse model and conjectural variation are
applied to assess the level of competition. The results show that the prevailing
market structure in the WAEMU financial industry is concentrated and financial
intermediaries operate under imperfect competition. Although competition was
fierce during the mid-2000s, the level of competition has remained limited. Mo-
reover, apart from Benin and Mali, the structural and non-structural approaches
are closely related, contrary to previous findings, which have some implications
for the empirical studies. Finally, a common regulatory framework does not im-
ply similar level of competition. The presence of non-legal barriers is the most
plausible explanation of these large differences between WAEMU members.
Key words : Banking competition, Market structure, Panzar-Rosse model, Conjec-
tural variation model, WAEMU
JEL codes : D4, G21, L11, L13, O55
Acknowledgement : I am grateful to Samuel Gue´rineau and Vianney Dequiedt for
their helpful comments. All remaining errors are my own.
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1 Introduction
Africa remains today one of the most financially under-developed parts of the world.
Recent decades have seen a remarkable increase in the number of financial reforms in
Africa. A main reason for these reforms was to make the financial sector more competitive.
Studies of competitive bank conditions, its determinants and its effects, in the developed
countries are commonplace. However, there have been relatively few studies conducted in
the Low Income Countries (LIC) and in particular in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and no
empirical work for the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) has been
done.
This paper assesses the level of bank competition in the WAEMU. Contrary to other
studies, all financial intermediaries are included in our database 1. The sample considers
111 firms in 7 countries over the period 2002-2007. We use two main approaches to
measure bank competition : the structural and the non-structural approach. The first one
assesses bank competition by examining market structures. Market structures take into
account the importance of (legal and non-legal) barriers of entry and exit into the market.
We consider the most frequently applied measures of concentration namely the 3-bank
concentration ratio (CR3) and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The non-structural
approach focuses on the behavior of banks. We use two non-structural approaches : the
H-statistic created by Panzar and Rosse [1982, 1987] and the conjectural variations (CV)
model developed by Iwata [1974] and Appelbaum [1982].
The most important results are as follows : Although competition was fierce during the
mid-2000s, the level of competition remains limited in WAEMU. In SSA, only the CEMAC
and Botswana financial sectors are less competitive. Moreover, apart from Benin and
Mali, structural and non-structural approaches are closely related contrary to previous
findings [Claessens and Laeven, 2004]. Hence, concentration seems to be a good proxy to
competition environment for LIC although adaptationsshould be implemented [Degryse
et al., 2009]. Finally, a common regulatory framework does not necessarily imply the same
level of bank competition. Legal barriers are not as crucial to explain bank competition
1. The Fitch Bankscope Database is used in the majority of developing country bank sector research.
However, this dataset neglects many small and local-private owned banks or specific information is not
available (for instance, the number of employees).
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differences in LIC. Non-legal barriers account for a large part of bank competition and
liberalization is not sufficient to promote bank competition in LIC [Delis, 2012].
The structure of the rest of paper is as follows : Section 2 provides a background to
the financial system in the WAEMU countries. Section 3 discusses measures of market
structure. Section 4 presents the empirical results with the H-statistics. Section 5 shows
the results with the conjectural variation approach. The final section concludes.
2 Overview of the WAEMU banking system
The WAEMU financial sector has dramatically changed during the two last decades,
it has been liberalized and developed 2. Until the beginning of the 1990s the banking
system was highly administrative. This policy did not yield the expected results. Worse,
it caused the banking crisis at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s [Daumont et al., 2004].
Following the financial distress, reforms were put in place by the monetary authorities.
Insolvent banks were liquidated or privatized. A regulatory institution, called the banking
commission (COBAC), was created in 1990. This commission ensures the supervision of
bank activity and the compliance with legislation. In addition, interest rates and credit
distribution became market-determined to mobilize the funds and improve the allocation
of capital. Since reforms, political interventions have been reduced and the sector is now
largely liberalized. Liberalization should lead to fiercer competition within the banking
system.
Over the last decade, financial activity, as well economic activity, has grown. None-
theless, the WAEMU financial system is still small and relatively underdeveloped. The
financial depth in WAEMU remains very limited as the ratio of credit to the private sector
and bank branch penetration highlighted. The ratio of credit to the private sector repre-
sents only 13% of GDP in the WAEMU, lower than in other SSA countries (17%) and
other developing countries (between 30% and 50%). The demographic and geographic
branch penetration is inferior in WAEMU compared to the majority of SSA countries
2. In all this section, when the sources of data are not clearly mentioned, the data come from the CO-
BAC annual reports (COBAC [2002–2009]) and the BCEAO website (www.bceao.int). All calculations
are made by the author.
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(see Appendix A : Figure 2) 3. Moreover, the majority of bank-branches are concentra-
ted in the (economic) capitals 4. Within WAEMU, Niger and Guinea-Bissau are the least
financial developed countries.
The degree of product concentration, maturity structure, concentration of customers,
and price of financial services are other issues (see Appendix : Table 10). The main ser-
vices provided by financial intermediaries are the collection of resources from economic
agents, who have financial excess and provide loans to those who need financing. Apart
from Senegal and Togo, other services such leasing, factoring or securities represent less
than ten percent of total assets. Moreover, banks rarely provide long-term financing. The
loans of which maturity exceeds five years represent less than 5% of total loans. On the
contrary, more than two thirds of loans are short-term ones. Concerning the allocation of
loans by sector, the majority of resources are allocated to the services and trade sector
(see Appendix : Figure 3). More than one third of loans to the private sector are allocated
to the trade and tourism sector, less than one quarter to the secondary sector (manufac-
turing and extractive industries), and only 3% to the primary sector (mainly agriculture).
This allocation is largely unrelated to economic structure which is mostly dominated by
agriculture. These features shed light on the bank preference for liquidity and low-risk
assets. The analysis of the price of financial services and the cost of financial interme-
diation confirms this conclusion. According to Beck et al. [2010] data, the net interest
margins in WAEMU are lower than ones in other Sub-Saharan Countries and Asia (See
Appendix : Figure 4). The most plausible explanation is the prudential behavior of banks
that implies a low risk-premium. However, risk-aversion behavior of banks penalizes SME
and private sector development.
As many other SSA financial systems, the financial sector in WAEMU is dominated
by banks. Banks represent more than 80% of financial institutions and more than 95% of
assets. There are currently about one hundred financial institutions formally approved in
WAEMU. The financial sector is mostly foreign-owned (see Table 1). At the regional level,
3. Calculations are based on the Beck et al. [2007] methodology and no-WAEMU data comes from
Beck et al. [2007].
4. In 2007, two thirds of bank branches were located in the capitals.
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Table 1 – Ownership structure (% of capital)
Benin Burkina-Faso Ivory Coast Guinea-Bissau
2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010
Domestic 31.7 31 51.2 43.7 51.3 56.5 41 52.4
- State 5.9 2.0 19.0 20.0 23.4 26.1 9.6 0.0
- Private 25.8 29.0 32.2 23.7 27.9 30.4 31.4 52.4
Foreign 69.3 69 48.8 56.3 48.7 43.5 59 47.6
- WAEMU NA 23.8 NA 11.7 2.7 9.2 NA 25.5
- No WAEMU NA 45.2 NA 44.6 46 34.3 NA 22.1
Mali Niger Senegal Togo
2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010
Domestic 53.8 43.3 49.6 31.7 45.7 28.1 33.0 52.2
- State 33.4 23.5 28.6 7.7 14.9 5.3 20.9 29.8
- Private 20.4 19.8 21.0 24.0 30.8 22.8 12.1 22.4
Foreign 46.2 56.7 50.4 68.3 54.3 71.9 67 47.8
- WAEMU 0.0 2.7 NA 9.3 NA 5.9 NA 22.2
- No WAEMU 46.2 54.0 NA 59 NA 66 NA 25.6
Source : COBAC annual reports, Author’s calculations.
the average foreign share of bank capital is about 60%, while private local share is around
20%. Government ownership of banks in WAEMU is limited, only one fifth of capital is
owned by the State, and it has declined since the reforms in the 1990s. These features
are more pronounced for Benin and Senegal which have a foreign and a private-owned
system.
Regarding the ownership structure, another feature is important. A few number of
holdings dominate the market. More than three-fifth of assets, branches, accounts and
staff are in the hands of the seven biggest holdings, while they account for only one
third of banks. The major holding is Ecobank (its market share is 14.8%) followed by
Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale (12.9%), BOA Group (10.7%), Attijariwafa Bank (10.3%), BNP Paribas
(8.5%), AFG (5.5%) and United Bank for Africa (2.6%). Ten more small holdings play
a role in the market : BSIC, Lybian Foreign Bank, Citibank, BRS, BID, Financial BC
SA, COFIPA, Standard Chartered BV, Access bank Pic and Alios Finance. They control
another third of bank and less than ten percent of assets and branches.
African groups are more active than non-African ones 5. This feature emphasizes the
5. The market share of African holdings has increased during the last decade. They expand their
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attractiveness of WAEMU market for African banks and might change the financial land-
scape in the future. Future research should take into account modifications implied by
this trend.
3 Literature review
The literature regarding the assessment of competitive behavior is divided into two
main streams : the structural and the non-structural approaches. The first one tries
to assess the concentration in the market while the second one describes the observed
behavior of firms.
The structural approach is based on the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm
(SCP-paradigm henceforth) developed by Mason [1939] and Bain [1956]. The competitive
features of industry are inferred from structural characteristics which influence firm be-
havior and performance. According to SCP-paradigm, structures influence conduct (e.g.
a more concentrated market leads to a more collusive behavior by the firms) and conduct
influences performances (e.g. less competitive behavior leads to higher price, lower quan-
tity, abnormal profit and hence lower social efficiency). In other words, the SCP-paradigm
argues that bank concentration implies uncompetitive behavior by firms. Hence simple
measures of concentration are exogenous indicators of the intensity of competition. Theo-
retically and empirically there are many problems with SCP-paradigm and concentration
measures 6. Two main industrial organization theories investigate whether SCP-paradigm
is biased. Firstly, the efficiency structure (ES) hypothesis shows that structure is not ne-
cessarily exogenous [Demsetz, 1973, Peltzman, 1977]. According to ES hypothesis, mar-
ket structure itself is affected by firms’ conduct and performance. Secondly, the theory
of contestability, developed by Baumol et al. [1983], investigates in another way whether
concentration might be biased indicators of competitive environment. In a contestable
network in WAEMU by de novo implantation (for example UBA) or by the acquisition of existing bank
(for instance Attijariwafa which took the control of IUB holding in Ivory Coast and Senegal). At the same
time, the market share of the non-African groups has declined during the last five years. In 2005, Socie´te´
Ge´ne´rale and BNP Paribas were the two major holdings (second and fifth currently). Other non-African
holdings have left the market, for example, Belgolaise or Credit Lyonnais.
6. All critics are not exposed : For more details see Berger et al. [2004] and Degryse et al. [2009].
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market, which is characterized by the threat of entry, a firm is unable to raise its prices
above marginal cost. Thus a high concentrated market can be competitive if firms can
enter and exit freely the market.
In reaction to the deficiencies of the structural measures, non-structural approaches of
competitive behavior were developed in the 1980s. The aim was to obtain a direct measure
of the firms’ behavior. Two non-structural models are largely used in bank competition
literature 7 : the conjectural variations model and the H-statistics model. Both are based
on a static theory of the firm models under equilibrium conditions and need detailed
information on firms. The conjectural variation model is based on the idea that a firm
when choosing its output takes into account the reaction of rival firms. On the contrary,
the H-statistics model does not consider interactions between firms but focuses on the
reaction of firms when input prices are changing.
Empirical studies of the conjectural variations in banking have been applied to de-
veloped countries. Applications to developing and in particular to African countries are
scarce : Biekpe [2011] applies this method to Ghana, Mwega [2011] to Kenya and Zhao
and Murinde [2011] to Nigeria. No clear-cut feature emerges and the results depend on
the sample and method used.
The H-statistic suggested by Panzar and Rosse [1982, 1987] is another frequently
used approach. The Panzar and Rosse model allows the obtaining of the identification
of a competitive environment through a parameter (the H-statistic). The H-statistic is
the sum of the elasticities of the revenues of the firms with respect to their factor input
prices. Contrary to the conjectural variation model (which requires detailed information
on cost and demand), the H-statistic only needs revenues and factor prices data 8. Many
studies have applied the Panzar and Rosse methodology to banking in developed coun-
tries (see Bikker et al. [2011] for a broad review). Apart from Japan and Italy, developed
countries are characterized by a monopolistic competition structure. A growing part of
7. Other non-structural models exist such as the Boone indicator [Boone, 2008] or the persistence
of profit indicator [Goddard and Wilson, 1999]. We ignore the other models which are rarely used in
banking literature and require panel data with high temporal dimension.
8. Shaffer [2004] presents a detailed analysis concerning of the advantages and disadvantages of the
two NEIO tests.
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Table 2 – Summary of published empirical P-R studies on SSA banking industry
Country Period H-statistic Number of Banks Obs Author(s)
Botswana 1990-2004 0.23 6 50 Bikker and Spierdijk [2008]
CEMAC 1993-2004 0.27 32 148 Saab and Vacher [2007]
Uganda 1999-2002 0.30 15 196 Hauner and Peiris [2005]
2002-2004 0.49 15 97 Hauner and Peiris [2005]
Zambia 1990-2004 0.53 8 57 Bikker and Spierdijk [2008]
1999-2008 0.83 11 440 Mwenda and Mutoti [2011]
Ghana 1998-2003 0.56 13 65 Bikker and Spierdijk [2008]
1991-2004 0.61 15 87 Buchs and Mathisen [2005]
2001-2007 0.66 17 119 Biekpe [2011]
Mauritius 1991-2004 0.58 12 50 Bikker and Spierdijk [2008]
Kenya 1994-2001 0.58 34 106 Claessens and Laeven [2004]
1989-2004 0.62 38 188 Bikker and Spierdijk [2008]
Tanzania 2004-2008 0.66 26 101 Simpasa [2011]
Nigeria 1994-2001 0.67 42 186 Claessens and Laeven [2004]
1989-2004 0.74 63 319 Bikker and Spierdijk [2008]
South Africa 1994-2001 0.85 45 186 Claessens and Laeven [2004]
1987-2004 0.54 32 189 Bikker and Spierdijk [2008]
Note : The market is characterized by a collusive situation if H ≤ 0 ; by a monopolistic compe-
tition if 0 < H ≤ 1 ; and by a perfect competition situation if H = 1.
literature concerns the emerging countries from Latin America, Asia and MENA. The pa-
pers stress that most banking sectors in MENA operate under a monopolistic competition
structure 9. Empirical evidences from Latin America and Asia are more diverse although
the situation of monopolistic competition or perfect competition dominates remains 10.
Empirical investigations in Sub-Saharan Africa are scarce because bank data are rarely
available. The table 2 sums up the existing literature concerning SSA banking system
which is best characterized by monopolistic competition.
We propose to measure competition in WAEMU financial sector by using both struc-
tural and non-structural approaches. As far as we know, it is the first study applied to
WAEMU countries.
9. See : Al-Muharrami et al. [2006], Turk-Ariss [2009] and Anzoategui et al. [2010].
10. See : Gelos and Roldos [2004], Yeyati and Micco [2007], Olivero et al. [2010].
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4 Market structure analysis
The data has been obtained from annual individual bank balance sheets and income
statements of financial institutions published in COBAC’s annual reports (COBAC [2002–
2009]). This study covers all (bank and non-bank) financial institutions in WAEMU over
the period 2002-2007. The final unbalanced data sample consists of 591 bank-year obser-
vations 11.
Concentration measures give a view of entry and exit barriers in the market. k-bank
concentration ratio (CRk) and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) are the most frequently
used measures of concentration. Both require limited data and are easily computable and
understandable. CR3 is the sum of the market share (si) of the three largest banks in
the market, it takes the form :
CR3 =
3∑
i=1
si, with s1 ≥ s2 ≥ s3 ≥ sj, ∀j ≥ 4 (1)
The index approaches zero (minimum value is 100 ∗ (3/n), with n the number of firms in
the industry) for an infinite number of equally sized firms and it equal to 100 if the firms
included in the calculation make up the entire industry.
HHI is the most frequently used concentration measure by researchers and bank regulatory
agencies. Algebraically, it takes the form :
HHI =
n∑
i=1
s2i , ∀i = 1, . . . , n (2)
HHI captures the entire distribution of firm sizes. HHI is sensitive to its two constituent
parts ; (i) the number of firms, and (ii) the inequality in market shares among the different
firms. The HHI index ranges between 100 ∗ (1/n) (for equally sized firms) and 10000 (for
a monopoly). According to previous studies and current screening guidelines in the USA,
the banking industry is regarded to be a competitive market if the HHI is less than 1000,
a somewhat concentrated market if the HHI lies between 1000 and 1800, and a very
concentrated market if HHI is more than 1800.
11. All financial figures are expressed in 2000 FCFA.
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Figure 1 – Evolution of HHI and its components
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The total assets have been taken as the measure of bank size to compute the CR3 and the
HHI 12. Both concentration measures show that the WAEMU banking sector is moderately
concentrated. Concentration in the WAEMU was reduced during the 2000s with a break
in 2005 (cf Figure 1). Two elements can explain this trend : the number of firms and the
firm size distribution (Bikker and Haaf [2002b]). In order to distinguish between both,
we compute the number of firms and the Gini coefficient evolutions (base unit=2000) 13.
The number of firms has increased from 86 in 2000 to 116 in 2007. It was stable until
2004 (90 banks operated in 2004) and increased sharply since 2005. At the same time,
the Gini coefficient has remained relatively stable over the period. The distribution of
the market share did not dramatically change during the 2000s. Thus, the HHI decline is
largely explained by the opening of new banks since in the mid-2000s.
Within the WAEMU, four groups can be distinguished (cf. Table 5) : (i) The market
12. Using the total deposits or total loans does not significantly change the results and conclusions.
13. The Gini coefficient is a measure of the inequality of distribution, a value of 0 expressing total
equality and a value of 1 maximal inequality. Contrary to concentration measures, the Gini coefficient
has two main characteristics : scale independancy and population independancy.
12
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Table 3 – Levels of concentration by country
Average 2000 2007 Market Structure
CR3 HHI CR3 HHI CR3 HHI (level of concentration)
Benin 71.12 2296 78.33 2671 64.41 1827 High
Burkina-Faso 55.65 1521 66.93 1947 48.10 1827 Moderate
Ivory Coast 48.03 1150 51.33 1299 42.91 1021 Low
Guinea-Bissau 98.17 6551 100a 10000a 94.06 3427 Very high
Mali 58.85 1744 54.53 1506 54.62 1428 Moderate
Niger 68.45 1931 71.28 2015 64.57 1781 High
Senegal 57.89 1444 54.90 1445 60.43 1467 Moderate
Togo 58.50 1519 56.64 1458 60.76 1592 Moderate
aData for 2001
concentration is low in Ivory Coast ; (ii) Senegal, Burkina-Faso, and Togo are moderately
concentrated ; (iii) Benin, Mali, and Niger are heavily concentrated ; (iv) Guinea-Bissau
is a singular country with a young banking system (only one bank operated until 2005).
Apart from Guinea-Bissau, the levels of concentration in WAEMU members were mode-
rate in 2007, comparatively to other SSA and MENA countries (see : Appendix Figure
5).
5 Panzar and Rosse model : The H-statistic
5.1 Methodology
The Panzar and Rosse [1982, 1987] model (PR henceforth) is the most commonly used
test of the degree of competition. The test is based on reduced-form revenues function
and identifies the market structure of the industry. The H-statistic, which measures the
level of competition, is the sum of the elasticities of total revenues of the firm with respect
to its input prices and its values ranging from −∞ to +1. Under the long-run competitive
equilibrium, H-statistic is equal to unity. By contrast, H-statistic will be zero or negative
if the firm operates as a monopoly. Finally, if the market is characterized by monopolistic
competition, the H-statistic will lie between zero and one. According to Panzar and Rosse
13
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[1987], not only the sign of the H-stastic matters, but also its magnitude 14.
A number of working assumptions are required to apply the PR approach to banks
(or financial institutions). Banks must be treated as single product firms and inputs are
homogenous 15. Moreover, the demand elasticity has to be superior or equal to one. Last
but not least, banks should be observed from a (long-run) equilibrium perspective (Shaffer
[1982]).
5.2 Data and econometric specification
We use the same dataset to perform our first empirical test, the Panzar and Rosse
H-statistic. However, contrary to the previous section, some filtering rules are applied 16.
Guinea-Bissau is omitted because only 8 bank-year observations are available. This re-
duces the sample to an unbalanced panel of 7 countries consisting of 110 banks (484
bank-year observations) for the period 2002-2007.
For bank i at time t, the revenues function to be estimated is the following :
log(Ri,t) = β1log(w
L
i,t) + β2log(w
F
i,t) + β3log(w
K
i,t) + γ1riski,t + γ2equityi,t
+ γ3depositi,t + γ4oneai,t(+γ5sizei,t) + αi + µt + i,t (3)
where the subscript i denotes bank and the subscript t denotes year. The H-statistic is
the sum of the input price elasticities : H = β1 + β2 + β3. Dependent variable [log(Ri,t)]
is the natural logarithm of total income that includes interest and non-interest revenues.
Following previous studies, the model chosen is the intermediation one (Sealey and Lindley
14. Shaffer [2004] casts doubt on the use of the H-statistic as a continuous measure of competition
although Vesala [1995] proves that the H-statistic is a continuum under certain conditions. In empirical
studies, Bikker and Haaf [2002a] and Claessens and Laeven [2004] consider it as a continuum. In order
to compare competition levels, we consider the H-statistic as a continuum. However, the results have to
be treated with caution.
15. In other words, higher input prices cannot be correlated with higher quality services that generate
higher revenues.
16. Firstly, to avoid outliers, we drop observations where prices and/or average cost are not comprised
between the 1-st and 99-th percentile. Secondly, we drop observations in which one of the dependent
variables (total revenues and ROA) or independent variables are not available. Finally, we exclude ob-
servations if prices of inputs, total assets, deposits, loans or equity is negative.
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[1977]). We consider three inputs : labor, funds and physical capital. The price of labor
(wLi,t) is measured by the ratio of personnel expenses to the total number of employees,
the price of funds (wFi,t) by the ratio of interest expenses to total funds, and the price
of physical capital (wKi,t) by the ratio of other expenses (operational and depreciation) to
total fixed assets. Following Bikker et al. [2011], additional control variables have been
included to consider bank behavior and risk profile. The risk profile is composed of two
variables. The ratio of customer loans to total assets (riski,t) holds credit and illiquidity
risks. A higher proportion of loans should generate greater revenues ; hence the expected
sign of risk is positive. The ratio of equity to total assets (equityi,t) accounts for the
leverage and capitalisation, reflecting differences in the risk preferences across banks.
The coefficient could exhibit a negative or a positive sign. On the one hand, a lower
equity ratio reflects a more risk-taking behaviour, greater leverage and therefore higher
interest revenues (Molyneux et al. [1994]). On the other hand, more equity can balance
more risky behaviour, suggesting a positive coefficient (Bikker and Haaf [2002a]). Other
variables consider banks behavior as the ratio of customer deposits to short term funding
(depositi,t) which captures important features of the funding mix. The ratio of other
non-earning assets to total assets (oneai,t) reflects certain characteristics to the assets
composition. The sign of oneait is unclear. A larger share of non-interest assets is likely
to reduce interest income but may raise other income.
Size is added in previous studies to take into account the economies of scale. Bikker
et al. [2011] demonstrate that the introduction of size (scaled revenue equation) as the
control variable biases the results 17. The appropriate H-statistic is based on an unscaled
revenue equation (without size). The scaled model is implemented to compare our results
with existing literature and check the robustness. Size is measured by the natural loga-
rithm of total assets (sizei,t). All firm-specific and time-varying factors that could affect
the level of total revenues are captured through the insertion of bank-dummy (αi)
18 and
17. The use of price (total revenue to total assets) as the dependent variable has similar distorting
effect (Bikker et al. [2011]).
18. The panel can be estimated by a pooled estimator, fixed-effects estimator or random effects es-
timator depending on the nature of the individual effects (αi). If there are no bank-specific effects, we
can pool the observations and estimate the model using ordinary least squares. To test the pooling res-
triction, we use a F-test, discarding that all individual effects equal zero (results not reported). Pooling
15
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year-dummy variables (µt). In all regressions, we adjust the standard errors of the regres-
sion model using the Huber-White method to ensure any remaining heteroskedasticity in
the errors terms. Descriptive statistics and correlation are presented in Appendix.
A correct specification of the H-statistic value requires that the prices of the inputs
(labor, deposits and physical capital) are exogenously given. Concerning labor and phy-
sical capital, banks compete with many other firms for their acquisitions ; hence, this
hypothesis can be acceptable. While banks can influence the price of deposits, it is hard
to imagine that deposit interest rates are fully under the banks control. The Central bank,
by its intervention, constrains the market power of banks in the funds markets. A fringe
of market power can exist for banks which are installed in remote areas. Insofar as the
network of banks is largely concentrated in large cities we neglect the problem of deposits’
price endogeneity.
Finally, as noted previously, one of the crucial hypotheses of the PR model is that the
market is assumed to be in equilibrium. Thus, an equilibrium test should be performed
by using an indicator of firm return as the dependent variable, with the same econometric
specification (method and independent variables). The equilibrium statistic E is calcu-
lated as the sum of the elasticities of the firm return with respect to its input prices.
The market is in equilibrium if E-statistic is zero 19. To fulfill this condition, the following
regression is run :
log(1 +ROAi,t) = β1log(w
L
i,t) + β2log(w
F
i,t) + β3log(w
K
i,t) + γ1riski,t
+ γ2equityi,t + γ3depositi,t + γ4oneai,t(+γ5sizei,t) + αi + µt + i,t (4)
where ROAi,t is the pre-tax return on assets. Insofar as ROAi,t can be on negative values,
we add a constant to avoid to drop the negative numbers. The equilibrium statistic E is
estimation is not appropriate. Following the panel date literature, we use the Hausman test to determine
the appropriate estimator [Greene, 2003]. According to it, random effects estimators are biased, and we
run fixed-effects estimators.
19. The profit is independent to price in the long-run equilibrium (Shaffer [1982]). However, according
to Bikker et al. [2011], this equilibrium is not a perfect one. E-statistic can be negative for monopoly,
oligopoly or short-run competitive equilibrium. So if H < 0 and E > 0, this would be consistent with
monopoly or oligopoly. Nonetheless, if E = 0 long-run equilibrium characterizes the market. We will
conduct equilibrium test to assess the validity of this crucial assumption.
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calculated as the sum of the input price elasticities :E = β1 + β2 + β3. If the E-statistic
equals zero, this implies that the banking market is in long-run equilibrium.
5.3 Estimation results
The results presented in Table 4 suggest that the WAEMU banking sector is characte-
rized by monopolistic competition for the period 2002-2007. The H-statistic lies between
0 and 1, with a value of 0.48 (0.51 for scaled equation). According to F-test results, it
is possible to reject the hypothesis of perfect competition (H=1) and collusion (H=0).
Although cross country comparisons results should be treated with caution 20, the degree
of competition in the WAEMU appears to be limited compared with other SSA countries
(see Table 2). It appears that the WAEMU banking sector is slightly less competitive
than those in Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, and Nigeria but more competitive than those in
the CEMAC or Botswana. As a reminder, the previous section has shown that CEMAC
banking sector is more concentrated than in the WAEMU, although Ghana and Kenya
banking sectors are less concentrated. Although the lack of data does not allow to com-
pare HHI and H-statistic results, the discernment is that there is a strong and negative
relation between concentration and competition in the SSA banking sectors.
As concentration indexes analysis has shown (see previous section), 2005 is a break-
year. We attempt to examine whether this break has implied a change in the competition
environment. To do this, we run equations over two sub-periods : 2002-2004 and 2005-
2007. The level of competition rose in the 2000s (the H-statistics value increased from 0.50
to 0.80). For the first sub-period, perfect competition and monopoly can be rejected at
1% level. Monopolistic competition characterizes market structure over the period 2002-
2004. Considering the latter period, perfect competition is not always rejected (contrary
to monopoly). The latest result is subject to a number of statistical caveats : (i) small
number of observations are used, and (ii) the equilibrium test is rejected (E 6= 0).
The H-statistic calculated indicates that banks in the WAEMU region operate un-
20. The methodology and data used are not the same for each paper.
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Table 4 – Results from PR model for WAEMU (as a whole)
2002-2007 2002-2004 2005-2007
Unscaled Scaled Unscaled Scaled Unscaled Scaled
wL -0.0412 -0.0433 0.114 0.0913 -0.00248 0.0171
(-0.301) (-0.524) (0.909) (0.982) (-0.0195) (0.208)
wF 0.298* 0.278** 0.226* 0.252*** 0.449*** 0.341***
(1.888) (2.499) (1.955) (2.720) (4.166) (3.724)
wK 0.223*** 0.272*** 0.213** 0.232*** 0.396*** 0.343***
(3.038) (4.031) (2.373) (3.234) (3.106) (3.041)
risk 1.918** 1.134* 0.990** 0.889** 1.164** 0.849**
(2.181) (1.817) (2.417) (2.059) (2.383) (2.249)
deposit -0.214 -0.408 -0.396 0.0804 -1.067* -0.574
(-0.585) (-1.391) (-0.488) (0.236) (-1.757) (-0.983)
equity -0.201** 0.0363 -0.0576 0.156* -0.119* 0.0429
(-2.193) (0.697) (-0.513) (1.829) (-1.961) (0.702)
onea -0.0597 0.126* -0.114 -0.0759 -0.113 0.0694
(-0.724) (1.825) (-1.014) (-0.838) (-1.207) (0.885)
size 1.044*** 0.739*** 1.114***
(12.09) (5.896) (9.380)
constant 7.794*** -1.502 8.009*** 0.852 9.220*** -2.015
(7.858) (-1.197) (7.560) (0.651) (11.31) (-1.420)
Obs. 484 484 220 220 264 264
Nb of Banks 110 110 84 84 102 102
R2 0.524 0.753 0.352 0.552 0.731 0.865
H-statistic 0.48 0.51 0.553 0.575 0.842 0.701
H=0 (F-Test) 3.85* 9.04*** 14.22*** 14.63*** 16.18*** 15.19***
H=1 (F-Test) 4.53** 8.58*** 9.30*** 7.97*** 0.57 2.77*
E=0 (F-Test) 0.001 0.003 0.043** 3.84* -0.009 1.11
Hausman test 64.80*** 32.24*** 37.47*** 35.66*** 60.84*** 15.76*
Note :*,** and *** significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respec-
tively. Dependent variable is the total revenue. H-statistic is the
sum of the elasticites of total revenues of the firm with respect
to its inputs prices. E-statistic represents equilibrium test based
on Eq(4) (not reported). The table reports the results from a pa-
nel regressions using yearly data on individual banks for the period
2002-2007. All regressions are run with within estimator and year-
dummies are included. t-Statistic are based on robust Huber-White
sandard errors.
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Table 5 – Results from PR model by WAEMU members
Benin Burkina Ivory Mali Niger Senegal Togo
Faso Coast
Unscaled model
H-statistic 0.61 0.88 1.13 -0.24 1.45 0.49 0.48
R2 0.818 0.698 0.608 0.624 0.626 0.912 0.796
H=0 (F-Test) 10.31*** 8.75*** 6.81** 0.35 1.53 12.40*** 0.81
H=1 (F-Test) 4.16* 0.17 0.10 9.67*** 0.15 12.98*** 0.95
E=0 (F-Test) -0.03 0.03 0.002 -0.02 0.22 -0.03 0.06
Hausman test 36.27*** 23.09*** 30.86*** 43.36*** 23.30*** 25.61*** 23.22***
Scaled model
H-statistic 0.95 0.69 1.26 0.16 0.24 0.57 0.82
R2 0.898 0.837 0.718 0.905 0.769 0.952 0.888
H=0 (F-Test) 18.66*** 10.06*** 15.26*** 1.07 0.07 14.02*** 8.58**
H=1 (F-Test) 0.04 1.97 0.63 27.95*** 0.72 7.99** 0.40
E=0 (F-Test) -0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.15 -0.03 0.08
Hausman test 29.24*** 14.82 20.08* 21.33* 12.31 41.31*** 22.14**
Obs. 58 78 93 76 46 86 47
Nb. of Banks 14 16 22 17 10 19 12
Note : *,** and *** significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. De-
pendent variable is the total revenue. The table reports H-statistic value and
tests from country regressions using yearly data on individual banks for the per-
iod 2002-2007. All regressions are run with within estimator and year-dummies
are included. t-Statistic are based on robust Huber-White standard errors.
der condition of monopolistic competition ; however, a closer look at individual countries
shows different patterns among them. Table 5 presents the results for each WAEMU coun-
try (Guinea-Bissau is excluded). The results should be treated with caution, insofar as
the number of observations is limited in particular for Benin, Niger, and Togo (less than
70 bank-year observations and 15 financial institutions). Three different groups can be
distinguish. Firstly, Ivory Coast (H-statistic value is 1.13) is the most competitive coun-
try. The banking sector in Ivory Coast is characterized by perfect competition, insofar as
it is impossible to reject the hypothesis of perfect competition (H=1) contrary to the hy-
pothesis of monopoly (H=0). Secondly, banks in Benin, Burkina-Faso, Senegal, and Togo
operate under conditions of monopolistic competition. The rejection of the hypothesis of
perfect competition and monopoly for Senegal confirms such a result. The conclusions re-
garding the three other countries is less clear-cut. Thirdly, the market structure of banks
in Mali is best characterized by monopoly this is showed by a negative H-statistic value
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(-0.24). Finally, we cannot draw any conclusions about the Niger case (the unscaled and
scaled models give contradictory results). A possible explanation is the low number of
observations. In all regressions, the equilibrium conditions have been checked and R2 are
correct.
Apart from Benin and Mali, the empirical results reveal that the market power, re-
sulting from high concentration levels, exclude competitive behaviors (see : Table 9. The
existing barriers deter the entry enable to extract rents. Although legal impediments
certainly play a key role, the level of competition and concentration can be extremely dif-
ferent among currency union members that share a common regulatory and supervision
framework in developing countries 21.
5.4 Robustness checks
Three different robustness checks have been performed. These tests consist of changing
the sample (with the exclusion of non-bank financial institutions), the dependent variables
(total revenues has been replaced by interest revenues), and the specification (inclusion
of other control variables). Results (not reported) give no reason to alter the conclusions.
6 The conjectural variation model
6.1 Methodology
In order to assess the reliability of the previous results, we use the same dataset to
perform our latest empirical test based on the conjectural variation model. It is based
on the idea that a firm when choosing its output takes into account the reaction of rival
firms. On the contrary, the H-statistics does not consider interactions between firms but
focuses on the reaction of firms when input prices are changing. Many studies have ap-
plied conjectural variations to banking. We follow the approach and empirical specification
developed by Iwata [1974] and Appelbaum [1982] which were applied by Angelini and Ce-
torelli [2003], and Coccorese [2005, 2009]. Using Cournot competition model 22, loans are
21. The concentration measures computed by Saab and Vacher [2007] confirms these findings.
22. A price-setting model is developed by Coccorese [2005, 2009] and a two-products model is developed
by Suominen [1994]. Both models have the same econometric implications.
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produced by bank i. The inverse demand at time t is given by equation pit = pit(Qt, Zit),
where pit is the price that bank i charges, Qt =
∑N
j=1 qj is the industry production, and
Zit is a vector of exogenous factors influencing demand. In addition, let Cit = Cit(qit, wit)
be the cost function for bank i, where qit is the quantity that bank i produces, and wit is
the vector of the prices of inputs employed by the bank i. Hence, the profit maximization
problem of bank-i is given as :
piit = qitpit − Cit(qit(·), wit) (5)
The first order condition of Eq. 5 is given as :
∂piit
∂qit
= qit(·)∂pit
∂qit
+ pit(·)−MCit(·) = 0 (6)
where MCit(·) = ∂Cit(·)∂qit represents the marginal cost function. Rearranging Eq. 6, we get :
pit = MCit(·)− θit
ηit
= MCit(·)− λit (7)
where θit =
∂Qt/Qt
∂qit/qit
is the conjectural variation elasticity and ηit =
∂Qt/Qt
∂pt
is the price
semi-elasticity of demand. Eq. 7 allows to compute Lerner Index as follows : Lit =
λit
pit
.
The parameter θi,t(∈ [0; 1]) determines the degree of market power exercised by bank
i at the time t. The full exploitation of market power, for example, monopoly or perfect
collusion situation, coincides with θi,t = 1. When θit = 0, it conversely means that the
bank is compelled to behave as a perfect competitive bank (for which the price equals
the marginal costs). θit ∈]0; 1[ denotes an imperfect competitive situation. The specific
case of the Cournot competition occurs if θit =
1
n
, where n is the number of banks. The
identification of the behavioral parameter for each bank (θit) is impossible to obtain. The
aim is to compute the average degree of market power : θ = 1
NT
∑N
i=1
∑T
t=1 θit. We also
compute the average degree of market power by year (θt) and by country (θj).
6.2 Data and econometric specification
To assess the behavioral parameter (θ), we estimate a three-equation system. The
first equation represents the market demand function which allows to get the market
demand elasticity for the price. The second one is a total function that allows to get the
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marginal cost for each firm. Finally, the supply equation (Eq. 7) allows us to compute the
behavioral parameter. The loan demand function is assumed to take the following form :
ln(qit) = α0 +α1ln(pit)+α2ln(p¯jt−1)+α3foreignit+α4publicit+α5sizeit+α6branchesit
+ α7oldit + α8riskit + α9equityit + α10GDPpcjt + α11popdensityit + υj + νt + τit (8)
Subscripts i, j and t refer to bank, the country and the period respectively ; here, qit and
pit are the quantity and the price of the output (loans) of bank i. The demand elasticity
is directly given by the parameter α1. Bank-specific control variables are included : the
one-lag of the average price of all other financial institutions in the market (p¯jt−1) in
order to take into account the price set by competitors 23. We also include bank-specific
variables : the share of capital owned by the State (publicit) and by foreigners (foreignit),
the size (which is measured by the natural logarithm of equity 24), the number of branches
(branchesit), the age of the bank which is a proxy of reputation (oldit), the ratio of
customer loans to total assets (riskit), and the ratio of equity to total assets (equityit).
Two market specific control variables are included : GDP per capita (GDPpcjt) and the
density of population (popdensityjt). Finally, the demand equation is run with country
(υj) and time fixed effects (νt) and τit is an error term.
The second equation is a total cost function. In line with the main studies on the
banking industry, we consider a translog specification. Consistent with an intermedia-
tion approach, loans represent the banks’ output. Regarding the inputs, three factor are
considered (labor, physical capital, and deposits). The cost function assumes the following
form :
ln(Cit) = β0 + β1(lnqit) +
β1
2
(lnqit)
2 +
3∑
l=1
bl(lnw
l
it) +
3∑
l=1
β2+l(lnqit)(lnw
l
it)
+
1
2
3∑
l=1
b3+l(lnw
l
it)
2 +
∑
l 6=n
b6+l(lnw
l
it)(lnw
n
it) +
m∑
k=1
zmit + ϕj + ψt + φit (9)
23. We refer to the national level because we do not have more disaggregated information. The inclusion
of lag value allows to overcome the endogeneity issue.
24. It is a common way to measure size by the total assets (as in the previous section). However, in
our case study, total assets and total loans are highly correlated (ρ = 0.99)
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where φit is the error term and z
k
i,t is a vector of netputs
25. All country-specific and
time-varying factors that could affect the level of total cost are captured through the
insertion of country-dummy (ϕj) and year-dummy variables (ψt). We constrain the cost
function to be homogenous of degree one in input prices, implying the following restric-
tions :
∑3
l=1 bl = 1,
∑3
l=1 β2+l = 0, and
∑6
l=1 b3+l = 0. Measures of the output (loans)
and the prices of inputs are similar to the previous section.
Finally, the third equation is based on Eq. 7 :
pit = MCit(qit, w
l
it)− λt + ξit (10)
where ξit is an error term. Computing the marginal cost from Eq. 9 and introducing it in
Eq. 10, we get :
pit =
Cit
qit
[
β1 + β2(lnqit) +
3∑
l=1
β2+l(lnw
l
it)
]
− λt + ξit with λt = θ
ηt
(11)
The system we are going to estimate is formed by Equations 8, 9, and 11. The parame-
ter θ describes the degree of average market power exploitation in the WAEMU banking
system. System equations are estimated simultaneously in order to improve the preci-
sion and efficiency of estimations [Angelini and Cetorelli, 2003, Coccorese, 2005, 2009].
Owing to the endogeneity of the cost, price, and quantity we have to use the instrumen-
tal variables estimator (2SLS). Nevertheless, owing to cross-equation contemporaneous
correlations, seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) should be used. Affected by both
problems, we use the Three-Stage Least Square (3SLS), which combines 2SLS and SUR
estimators (Greene [2003]) and allows to take into account cross-equations restrictions.
Whilst 3SLS are convergent and efficient by correcting the variance-covariance matrix,
our results should be treated with caution insofar as the sample is small (Greene [2003]).
Convergence requires large sample and results are highly sensitive to specification other-
wise. The same dataset to assess the conjectural variation models is used than in previous
measures. Descriptive statistics and correlation are presented in Appendix.
25. The netputs include a dummy indicates if the financial institutions is a bank and the interaction
between the bank-dummy and output, and interactions between the bank-dummy and the three inputs.
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6.3 Results
The table 6 presents the WAEMU (entire sample) results from OLS, 2SLS, and 3SLS.
We report the behavioral parameter (θ) with associated tests and the computed Lerner
index (L). According to Coccorese [2009], the behavioral parameter (θ) refers to average
degree of competition. As the table 6 indicates, the average market power of banks in the
WAEMU is relatively high. The point estimate of θ is 0.78. It is possible to reject the
hypothesis of perfect competition (θ = 0) and of monopoly (θ = 1) at the standard levels.
The banking industry in the WAEMU is characterized by imperfect competition (as is the
Ghanaian banking industry [Biekpe [2011]]). The no-competitive behavior implies a high
level of Lerner index (between 50% and 70%) in the zone ; while the demand is elastic 26.
This result confirms the previous conclusions based on concentration and Panzar-Rosse
measures.
Concerning the other explanatory variables, the coefficient of foreign, branches and
reputation are positive and significant, as expected. The ratio of equity to total assets is
negatively and significantly related to loan demand, contrary to expectations. Although
the ratio of equity to total assets measures the risk profile of banks, the negative coeffi-
cient can be explained differently. Bank with a more active policy provides better quantity
(more revealed demand) and a ratio of equity to total assets which is lower. According
to our results, the second approach is dominant in the WAEMU banking system. Other
bank-specific variables included in the demand function are not significant at the stan-
dard levels. Concerning the macroeconomic variables, while the level of GDP per capita
has no significant impact, the density of population is negatively and significantly related
to loan demand. The coefficients of total cost function and supply function have expected
sign and are generally highly significant. The marginal cost is always positive.
The analysis of the change of banks’ conduct during the period is very interesting.
Particularly, we aim to verify whether there have been any modifications in their behavior
after 2005, when the structure of the market changed dramatically. The results from the
Panzar-Rosse model showed an increase in competition since the mid-2000’s. In order
26. The estimate of the price elasticity is highly significant and around to -1. An increase to 1% in
credit interest rate implies a contraction to 1% of the demand of loans.
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Table 6 – Conjectural variation model : WAEMU results
OLS 2SLS 3SLS
coef. t-stat coef. t-stat coef. t-stat
Demand function (Dependent variable : lnqit)
(lnpit) -0.842*** (-9.598) -1.025*** (-10.51) -1.112*** (-11.42)
ln(p¯jt−1) 0.0914 (0.202) -0.0429 (-0.0942) -0.0213 (-0.0468)
foreign 0.694*** (5.396) 0.645*** (4.966) 0.638*** (4.923)
public 0.305 (1.554) 0.190 (0.953) 0.143 (0.720)
size -0.0629 (-1.074) -0.0443 (-0.750) -0.0445 (-0.755)
risk -0.373 (-1.609) -0.340 (-1.458) -0.257 (-1.104)
cap -4,435*** (-10.68) -4,185*** (-9.931) -4,181*** (-9.950)
branches 0.567*** (15.10) 0.556*** (14.67) 0.544*** (14.39)
old 0.293*** (5.560) 0.319*** (5.990) 0.331*** (6.227)
GDPpc -8.25e-06 (-1.110) -8.55e-06 (-1.144) -8.84e-06 (-1.187)
pop density -0.0711** (-2.250) -0.0711** (-2.236) -0.0663** (-2.094)
constant 12.77*** (4.784) 12.14*** (4.516) 11.67*** (4.356)
R2 0.772 0.769 0.766
Total cost function (Dependent variable : lnCit)
(lnqit) 0.786*** (5.382) 1.249*** (6.164) 1.172*** (5.833)
(lnqit)
2 0.0227*** (4.050) 0.0277*** (4.497) 0.0343*** (5.603)
(lnwLit) 1.834*** (6.530) 2.073*** (6.167) 2.071*** (6.272)
(lnwFit) 0.842*** (3.818) 0.640** (2.190) 0.596** (2.080)
(lnwKit ) -1.677*** (-8.201) -1.713*** (-8.023) -1.668*** (-7.939)
(lnwLit)
2 -0.112*** (-4.115) -0.0225 (-0.699) -0.0122 (-0.381)
(lnwFit)
2 0.137*** (7.734) 0.205*** (9.370) 0.212*** (9.758)
(lnwKit )
2 -0.0483*** (-3.424) -0.0366** (-2.491) -0.0383*** (-2.634)
(lnqit)(lnw
L
it) -0.126*** (-5.082) -0.221*** (-6.399) -0.230*** (-6.735)
(lnqit)(lnw
F
it) 0.0356* (1.803) 0.121*** (3.954) 0.134*** (4.415)
(lnqit)(lnw
K
it ) 0.0903*** (4.766) 0.1000*** (4.992) 0.0964*** (4.876)
(lnwLit)(lnw
F
it) -0.0366* (-1.768) -0.110*** (-4.403) -0.119*** (-4.822)
(lnwLit)(lnw
K
it ) 0.148*** (12.37) 0.132*** (10.33) 0.131*** (10.36)
(lnwFit)(lnw
K
it ) -0.100*** (-8.549) -0.0954*** (-7.813) -0.0931*** (-7.695)
constant -0.937 (-0.765) -4.067** (-2.325) -3.691** (-2.144)
R2 0.961 0.957 0.957
Supply function (Dependent variable : pit)
θ/η 0.0940*** (8.998) 0.0991*** (8.853) 0.111*** (10.02)
R2 0.478 0.501 0.492
θ 0.4999 0.6412 0.7774
θ = 0 (χ2-test) 43.09*** 45.83*** 56.28***
θ = 1 (χ2-test) 43.14*** 14.35*** 4.62**
Lerner 0.4497 0.6254 0.6994
Obs. 371 371 371
Note :*, **, and *** significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
The table reports results from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Two-Stage
Least Squares (2SLS), and Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS). Year- and
country-dummies are included in demand and total cost function (not
reported). A vector of netputs is included in total cost function (not
reported). Lagged values of prices, loans, prices of funds, size, public-
and foreign ownership share, risk, and levels of capitalization are used
as instruments. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses.
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to confirm these previous conclusions, the average degree of market power is computed
by year. In order to cope with the lack of data, the equations system is modified by
the inclusion of the interaction between year-dummy and the price in the Eq. 8 and by
the inclusion of year-dummy in the Eq. 11. The cost function is unchanged. The table 7
Table 7 – Conjectural variation model : year results
θt θt = 0 (χ2-test) θt = 1 (χ2-test) θt = θ (χ2-test)
2003 0.6163 17.63*** 6.83*** 1.20
2004 0.8086 28.63*** 1.61 0.04
2005 0.4055 7.53*** 16.18*** 6.33***
2006 0.6188 17.99*** 6.82*** 1.18
2007 0.5088 17.12*** 15.95*** 4.77**
The table reports the computed behavioral parameter and associated tests.
reports the behavioral parameters and associated tests by year from 3SLS estimator 27.
The estimates of θt take on a value between 0.40 and 0.80 and are always significant. The
χ2-tests indicate that both the hypothesis of perfect competition (θt = 0) and the hypo-
thesis of monopoly (θt = 1) can be rejected for all years. Over the period, the banking
system in the WAEMU remains characterized by oligopolistic competition. Contrary to
the previous results from concentration ratios and PR model analysis, the 2005-break in
the level of competition exists (the behavioral parameter fell from 0.80 is 2004 to 0.40 in
2005) but it seems to be temporary.
Table 8 – Conjectural variation model : country results
θj θj = 0 (χ
2-test) θj = 1 (χ
2-test) θj = θ (χ
2-test)
Benin 1.2052 12.77*** 0.37 1.61
Burkina 1.0402 39.99*** 0.06 2.55
Ivory Coast 0.5562 13.77*** 8.77*** 2.18
Mali 0.7340 21.74*** 2.86* 0.08
Niger 0.0177 0.00 13.69*** 8.36***
Senegal 0.4525 7.71*** 11.31*** 3.98***
Togo 0.8951 9.80*** 0.14 0.17
The table reports the computed behavioral parameter and associated tests.
27. Owing to lack of instruments, the first year, 2002, is excluded.
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As previously, we investigate the level of competition among WAEMU members by
assessing the national average degree of market power. In order to cope with the lack of
data, the equations system is modified by the inclusion of the interaction between country-
dummy and the price in the Eq. 8 and by the inclusion of country-dummy in the Eq. 11.
The cost function is unchanged. Table 8 presents the results by country. Three groups of
countries can be distinguished using the respect to behavioral parameter tests and value.
The first group brings together Ivory Coast, Senegal, and Mali, which are characterized
by imperfect competition. The hypothesis of perfect competition and monopoly can be
rejected at 1% level of statistical significance for Ivory Coast and Senegal. For both, these
outcomes corroborate results from concentration ratios analysis and from the Panzar
and Rosse model for Senegal. The hypothesis of monopoly can be rejected at only 10%
level of statistical significance for Mali. This result does not confirm the previous results
that characterize the financial market in Mali as a monopolistic one. The second group
is composed by Benin, Burkina-Faso and Togo. Contrary to previous analysis, it is not
possible to reject the hypothesis of monopoly for the three banking systems. The third
group is composed of Niger. Albeit the behavioral parameter indicates a situation of
perfect competition in Niger, this result is subject to caution (coefficients may be biased
owing to the lack of data and previous analysis has highlighted the low level of competition
in the Niger banking sector). Finally, apart from Niger and Senegal, the national level
of market power is statistically equal to the average level of market power. The level of
competition seems to be equal in each member’s country. This last result is inconsistent
with previous conclusions that have revealed the lack of convergence in competition levels.
6.4 Robustness checks
In order to test the robustness of our results, different specifications have been imple-
mented. Firstly, we run the model by OLS and 2SLS. As mentioned previously, conver-
gence is not always achieved insofar as the sample is relatively small. 2SLS and 3SLS
should be given similar coefficients because both are convergent, albeit 3SLS estimator
is more efficient. As the Table 6 shows, these specifications give different results (the
behavioral parameter is higher in 3SLS). Moreover, the inclusion or exclusion of one (or
27
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more) variable(s) may change dramatically the results and conclusions. For instance, the
introduction of dummy for non-bank institutions in demand function modifies drama-
tically the results 28. Hence, the results from the conjectural variation model are highly
sensitive to specification. Consequently, results from the conjectural variation model must
be treated with caution ; insofar as we are not certain that the equations are correctly
specified. To conclude, we have more confident in the Panzar-Rosse model results which
have successfully passed many robustness checks.
7 Conclusion
This paper examines competitive structures in WAEMU banking sector over the per-
iod 2002-2007. Concentration market analysis and two NEIO techniques (Panzar-Rosse
model and conjectural variation model) are applied to a sample of 110 financial inter-
mediaries in the WAEMU. To our knowledge, no econometric analysis of the degree of
competitiveness in WAEMU banking sector has been conducted before.
The main results are as follows : Firstly, although competition was fierce during the
mid-2000s, the level of competition remains limited in WAEMU. The level of competition
is one of the lowest in the world. In SSA, only the CEMAC and Botswana banking sectors
are more collusive and concentrated.
Secondly, apart from Benin and Mali, structural and non-structural approaches are
closely related contrary to previous findings (cf. Table 9). Hence concentration is a good
proxy to a competitive environment for LIC.
Thirdly, even if the regulatory and supervision framework is the same, the level of
competition differs among WAEMU members. These results can be explained by two
ways : on the one hand, the implementation and law enforcement differ from country to
country. Nonetheless, although no figures are available, the assumption that law enfor-
cement does not significantly differ is acceptable. On the other hand, the most plausible
explanation is the fact that legal barriers are not so much crucial to the explanation of
bank competition in SSA and LIC. Recently, Delis [2012] has shown that financial libera-
28. While the WAEMU as a whole remains characterized as an imperfect competition market, it is
impossible to observe any difference between year and country.
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Table 9 – Summary of results
Concentration (HHI)
H-stats Low (HHI < 1000) Moderate (1000 ≤ HHI < 1800) High (HHI ≤ 1800)
Perfect competition Ivory Coast
Monopolistic WAEMU ; Burkina-Faso Benin
competition Senegal ; Togo
Collusion Mali
Unclassified Guinea-Bissau ; Niger
The first diagonal reflects the convergence of results.
lization policies increased competition in developed countries with advanced institutions.
In contrast, such policies have not been efficient in countries with weaker institutions.
What is more, concentration has a significant and positive impact on market power in
Low-Income Countries. Our results confirm his conclusions. Non-legal barriers account for
a large part of bank competition 29 that explain the relevance of concentration measures
as competition proxies.
Concerning the policy implications, this result highlights that financial liberalization
is not sufficient to promote bank competition in LIC. The bank competition policy should
not only be concentrated on legal impediments but also on non-legal ones. One major non-
legal barrier is the difficulty to obtain information by banks. Information can be viewed as
a sunk cost. In this way, the most effective policy in LIC should be to facilitate the access
of borrowers information by banks. In practice, two policies can be implemented : the first
one is to ease the production of information by firms, banks, and fiscal administration.
The second one is to facilitate the sharing of information. A first step in this way has been
developed by the Central Bank and other partners. For instance, since the mid-1990s the
accounting frameworks have been standardized and a credit bureau have been set up. In
addition, reforms to corporate legal framework give a better protection, so that investors
can foster the level of competition in banking sector. These reforms, among others, should
spur the bank sector competition and the financial development.
29. Moreover, demand-side factors may play a significant role and as far as we know, no analysis has
examined this issue.
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Table 11 – Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent variables
Total assets 499 69254.54 82275.73 456.3871 435232.2
Loans 497 54675.69 64278.05 187.8134 359890.3
Revenues 499 6972.073 8370.472 24.17682 49871.87
Return on Assets 499 0.0016944 0.0554618 -0.3206806 0.3999336
Total cost 497 5032.837 5575.653 25.93613 32580.86
Prices
price of output 497 0.1566019 0.1171525 0.0187155 0.7323285
wage 492 9.861947 5.709095 2.423851 55.68582
price of deposits 486 0.032338 0.0902667 0.0004535 1.941176
price of capital 493 3.019054 8.70962 0.1406422 92.33334
Other variables
risk 499 0.5692095 0.1899644 0.0006264 0.9617373
deposits 489 0.7727931 0.2827715 0 1
equity 499 0.1631248 0.1678675 0.0084337 0.9943
onea 499 0.0883698 0.0595969 0.0072452 0.5534102
equity to total assets 497 0.0000493 0.0002233 1.73E-07 0.0036599
p¯jt−1 497 0.1281046 0.0160394 0.0808109 0.2004317
foreign share 494 0.5616511 0.3509897 0 1
public share 494 0.1474447 0.2281085 0 1
branches 494 8.809717 12.1737 1 90
old 497 16.96378 13.17403 0 51
GDPpc 497 202457.8 120570.8 51737.94 371020.2
pop density 497 52.05007 29.5843 8.692682 115.8392
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